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The growth of business, especially small and medium scale enterprises
(SME) are critical for employment generation in less developed countries. This
study seeks to identify the role of the institutions of contract writing in busi-
ness formation. Specifically, this paper focuses on the impact of judiciary in
facilitating new small and medium entrepreneurs, especially those from dis-
advantaged sections of the society, to enter the market and start a business.
The main findings suggest that improvement in the functioning of judiciary
helps to flourish businesses. Moreover, the effect is found to be stronger for
socially disadvantaged groups. Not only this, we find that improvement in
court quality leads to concentration of firms to limited industries.
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1 Introduction
A business, seen from a theoretical perspective, is nothing but a set of contracts.
Efficient institutions of contract enforcement therefore are critical for proliferation of
business. In this paper we aim to see how court efficiency affects business performance
in India. More specifically, we are empirically estimating this relationship between
efficiency of formal institutions and various indicators of business performance by
utilizing a district-wise panel data set for eleven states in India.Even though, we
would expect court efficiency to affect business outcomes positively, in a country
like India, which is characterized by slow and costly court procedure, this question
is far from trivial. Conventional wisdom, that is supported by our interviews with
entrepreneurs, suggest that in the event of breach of contract, they usually do not
approach court and try to resolve the issue using informal mechanisms such as busi-
ness or social networks.
A cursory look at the condition of the Indian judiciary points to a host of inef-
ficiencies including court congestion, legal costs and delays and, in general, a lack
of reforms. In January 2013 there were around 30 million cases pending in different
courts in India. At present on an average it takes around 15 years for a civil case to
get resolved. If the situation does not improve there will be an estimated 150 million
pending cases by 2040 (Times of India, January 17, 2013). Such an inefficient court
system cast a negative spell on the business environment. India, ranking 132 out of
185 countries in terms of ease of business, puts up a very strong barrier to entry for
the new firms (Doing Business Report, 2013, p 3). The barrier is even more binding
for small and medium enterprises that play a very important role in employment
generation. Hence the need of the day is perhaps the presence of high quality formal
contracting institutions which will resolve disputes, enforce contracts and hence aid
the growth of entrepreneurship.
In the literature however, different views come up. According to the 2005
World Bank Enterprise Surveys, about 12.5 per cent of firms in the survey have
reported to be going to courts for resolving various issues over the period 2001-2004.
Furthermore, about “ 22.5 per cent of firms cite poor contract enforcement as a
constraint to doing business’’.Ahsan [2013] . Most of the papers that uses cross
country data also have found positive relationship between institutional quality and
economic development and growth [Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002, Rajan and Zingales,
1998]. However, these papers mostly look at the effect of property right institutions.
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One exception is Acemoglu and Johnson [2003] who distinguish between the effects
of property rights institutions and contracting institutions on growth. Using a cross
country data set they find that while good property right institutions have positive
effect on growth, the effect of contracting institutions is not robust. This could
be because in several less developed countries, in absence of any effective formal
institution, network and reputation based contract enforcement may help running
business. This result is consistent with our general expectation and several anecdotal
evidence.
There has been much less research though on this more specific question re-
garding relevance of institutions in affecting business decisions. Chemin [2012] finds
that reforms in civil court procedure leads to lower breach of contract, higher access
to capital and building of new capacity in India. Another closely related paper is
Klapper et al. [2006]. Their study, based on 34 Eastern and Western European coun-
tries, find that higher requirements to comply with formal bureaucratic regulation,
prevents new businesses from entering the industry by increasing entry cost.
In this paper we attempt to study how quality of contract enforcement institu-
tions affects decision-making of entrepreneurs. Specifically, we exploit the variation
in court efficiency across districts in India as well as over time to estimate our re-
lationship. One of the highlights of the paper is to create an objective measure of
district level court efficiency by utilising a novel dataset on functioning of district
courts across 13 states in India. The data set, collected from different high courts
across India, provides access to statistics such as number of cases pending at the
beginning of the year, number of cases instituted and solved as well as number of
cases pending at the end of any year for all the districts of these states for a varying
time span. We also have information on the age break-up of pending cases for some
states. This data set has been merged with All India Census of Micro Small and
Medium Enterprises MSME, to get the information on entrepreneurship. Our empir-
ical methodology is to regress various indicators of entrepreneurial decision-making
as well as firm-level performance on efficiency of the judiciary. For robustness, we
use alternative measures of court efficiency.
The indicators that we employ include both entrepreneurial decision making and
firm performance. Our main variable in the context of entrepreneurial decision mak-
ing is owners’ decision to formalize her enterprise. To elaborate, we look at whether
the owner registers her firm within one year of starting its operations. Our analysis
further looked at the nature of scale of operations of the firm using two variables -
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firms’ decision to operate as a micro as opposed to non-micro unit and the size of
the firm measured by the number of employees. We also looked at other aspects of
firm behavior that indicate the working of a contract enforcement mechanism.For
instance, a firm would have better access to loans when the contract underlying this
procedure of lending and borrowing is expected to be enforced well.Similarly the
characteristics of the employees of a firm may also indicate the degree of efficacy of
the contract enforcement mechanism.In presence of a strong contract enforcement
mechanism, a firm may be more inclined to hire more women or children or people
belonging to backward castes as they are socially more vulnerable. In the event of
a breach of contract, these employees are less likely to move to court to resolve the
disputes.Hence we expect the firms to employ a high proportion of these vulnerable
people when the courts are efficient. The firm is also less likely to follow minimum
wage norms in districts where courts are inefficient. The judicial quality is also
expected to be related to the firm’s likelihood of operating in sunk cost intensive
industry.Furthermore, in order to analyse the degree of the prevalence of informal
network,we also look at the extent to which firms are hiring employees belonging to
same network.Firm level performance variables like growth in net-worth and value
of exports as well as the firm’s decision to operate as an exporting unit are the other
outcome variables analysed in this paper.
The main findings of the paper suggest that firms are less likely to be regis-
tered within one year when they begin operating in districts where court efficiency is
weaker. Furthermore, the registered firms are more likely to operate at a smaller scale
and are less likely to avail loan when judicial quality is low. Firms are found to offer
lower wages to the employees when court inefficiency is high. As expected,firms’
are less likely to operate in industries which involve higher sunk costs when they
operate in poor institutional environment. The owner is more likely to hire man-
ager and workers belonging to same gender group when court inefficiency is high
thereby indicating the presence of strong informal networks. Finally, we also notice
that firms observe negative growth in their networth when court quality deteriorates.
In this paper, using a novel data set from the Indian courts, we examine how
court efficiency affects entrepreneurs from different social backgrounds. We find that
entrepreneurs from lower caste gain more from better formal courts than their coun-
terparts. This could be because of differential access to informal dispute resolution
mechanism for socially disadvantaged groups. Based on this fact, we further found
that lower caste entrepreneurs benefit more from improvement in the efficiency of
judicial system if they set up their enterprise in areas where there are lower ad-
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vantages under the informal network mechanism. We conjecture that in absence of
formal courts, people approach different community level bodies for dispute resolu-
tion which are dominated by upper caste members of the society. Hence, if formal
court improves, everyone gains, but lower caste entrepreneurs gain more. This re-
sult has some serious policy implications as improving court efficiency can help the
disadvantaged section more than the privileged section.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the data
used to test the implications of our model. Section 3 outlines the empirical frame-
work, followed by section 4 which reports the empirical findings. Finally section 5
concludes.
2 Qualitative survey in Bangladesh and India
One may think it is trivial that improvement in court will lead to proliferation
of business. Even though this point is theoretically true (and also empirically true for
developed countries), this is far from trivial for the less developed countries such as
India and Bangladesh. Before starting the quantitative work, we interviewed a few
entrepreneurs in Kanpur and Kolkata in India and in Dhaka, Bangladesh and asked
them about the forums for business dispute resolution that they use. The general
view that came up in the surveys is that they usually do not go to the court and
try to resolve the issue through business network or semi-formal arbitration through
their business association. Specifically we asked, (1) Whether the entrepreneurs have
ever been cheated? (2) If yes, how did they the resolve the incident? (3) Did they
go to the court, approached community leaders or simply let it go? (4) In view of
possible cheating incidents, do they restrict their business within the circle of known
people? (5) In terms of cheating, how does the experience of big and small business
differ? There was a general aversion of courts but the responses varied across the
type of firms – big firms and small firms reacted differently to the breach of contracts.
In Bangladesh, one of the entrepreneurs we met was F. P. Ltd. This is a fairly
large organization with 700 workers.1 It was cheated by an Indian company over
payment. It entered into payment contracts through Letter of Credit Agreement.
The cheque was passed initially, but the company failed to receive the payments.
The main complaint was against the Bank who issued the cheque. Then we went
1The incidents reported here were obtained from the details given by the person who represented
the company. We could not verify the veracity of their claims regarding a particular incident of
cheating
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to another company named Rochdale Business where the worker strength is 26 to
30 workers. They cater to local supply of forwarding any order. They take advance
payments for an order of higher than 1200 to 3500 Taka per month. However, no
advance payments were needed from known parties or big corporates. In one case,
a party did not pay Taka 3 to 4lakhs. But, they did not approach a court to settle
the dispute. Instead , they invested more capital for the sake of having a better
information regarding the reputation of the party in the future.
Four instances of cheating were reported in an interaction with the representa-
tive of Turjo Apparels Ltd. They entered into payment contracts through Letter of
Credit Agreements (LC) where 70% is paid initially, 10% is paid after shipping and
20% is paid after receipt. In a first instance of cheating, a supplier provided with
goods, 20% of which was defective. Supplier claimed that they can supply defective
samples to this extent. In another case, it was cheated by a company in India. It
did not make payment and claimed that it was owing to their American partners
getting bankrupt. In a third, a buying agent in France showed causes in LC and
stopped payment. In another case goods were to be shipped from Italy. They asked
for air transport and extra payment had to be made for that. But, bank refused
to bear the extra payment even if it was there in the LC. Another company called
J.K. Fashion , with a worker strength of 278, was cheated by foreign buyers. They
initially canceled the order and then sent other people to buy back at a lower price.
In case of SRP Sweaters Ltd. there was a case where there was mismatch between
the date of shipment mentioned in the Letter of Credit Agreements (LC) and actual
date and the loss was worth USD 17000. There were 400 workers at that time in the
organisation and a huge loss led to quality dispute in the organisation. Moreover,
there was pressure from Bangladesh bank as US dollars stopped coming.
Another organisation named Asian Textile told us that once they were not paid
by a businessman in India for the garments they supplied. The business associate
from India was a long time business partner of Asian Textile. But, even after the
incident of cheating, the connection still exists in the expectation of future gain.
To summarize, we find that cheating was ubiquitous in Bangladesh garment in-
dustry although, with time, as the export market developed the number of such
cases went down. More importantly, small players in the market are more likely to
be cheated than the big players. The banks also have institutional measures such as
letter of credits to deal with the issue of non-payment. But entrepreneurs never go
to court for resolving disputes. At most they approach the Bangladesh Garments
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Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) for arbitration. However, small
businessmen complained that BGMEA is biased in favor of the large entrepreneurs.
While interviewing the Indian counterpart, we find that the situation is not differ-
ent in India either. The representative of the Superhouse group in Kanpur reiterated
the same issue of cumbersome legal process. Representative of a business house in
manufacturing sector had the same opinion and told us that except for a few big
business houses such as TATA and Larsen Tubro, most of the contracts are verbal.
Even though there is a draft of contracts, no party is actually willing to go to court
if there is a breach of contract. Representative of Sucheta Enterprise which is also
in manufacturing sector had the same view. The main issues that came up in our
survey with Indian entrepreneurs can be summarized in the following points:
1. Existing Methods of Entering into a Contract: Large Firms often enter into pay-
ment contracts through Letter of Credit agreements (LC). However, contractors can
still get away with defaults by forging cases of missing documents etc. Therefore,
firms have gradually shifted to the method of advance payments. They only ship
products after receiving a 50% advance for the order.
2. Preferred Method of Dealing with Defaults: Though firms have a contract
draft, it is just for formality sake and most contracts are verbal. The best way to
deal with this problem is to start sidelining the buyers that are delaying payments.
Firms quickly switch to other buyers in case of defaults. This, in a way, threatens
the buyers and gets them to work efficiently in future.
3. Working of the Informal Credit System: It is difficult to blacklist a bad bor-
rower because he can quickly shift his base to another region like Chennai, Mumbai,
etc. Alternatively, people resort to means like picking up cars, etc. to extract the
money that the creditor has lent.
4. Criteria for Choosing Business Partners: Because firms do not have any for-
mal contracts with dealers as such, the main criteria for choosing these dealers is
the reputation of the dealer. Apart from dealers, raw material suppliers are chosen
through references from friends after which a team visits these suppliers and sees the
suppliers setup. They then assess these suppliers through a smaller trial order before
entering into an agreement for any big order.
5. Occurrences of Default and Ways of Dealing with it: Because cases of post-
dated checks can only be registered in the city where the check was issued, it is
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not an efficient way to deal with payment delays. Sometimes, chosen dealers fail to
provide the promised amount of business.
6. Payment Delays a Bigger Problem than Problem of Bad Quality Product:
Delay in payments is the biggest problem that firms manufacturing products of in-
dustrial use face. Payments can be delayed from 90 days up to a year. This delay is
not only from small buyers but also from large players.
7. Perception Regarding the Legal System of India: There is a general feeling
that the legal system in India does not support business environment. Indias legal
System is a very lengthy process and even when one wins the case, one cannot reap
any benefit of the victory unless and until it is a criminal case, which is not so in
case of transaction-related cases.
8. Role of Women: Women are not involved in the collection of raw material.
But at the subcontracting level, women do exist. Generally, these women take help
and support from their immediate family and husband. Payments are usually taken
care of by male members, because although there is a certain degree of respect for
women, people in this industry do not usually take women very seriously.
However, from the above mentioned experiences a new question may arise which
was opposite to the one we started this section with. One may ask, if no entrepreneur
goes to the court, why should the court matter at all? In response, we argue that
even if no one goes to court in equilibrium, court quality will affect the incentives
to cheat and the bargaining position of the contracting parties. For elaborate this
issue further, consider two extreme cases – one district with a very good court and
one district with very bad court. In both the cases, nobody goes to the court but
with different outcomes. In the first one there is no cheating as everyone knows
that the cheater will be punished and in the second one, people will cheat if there
is contract and therefore, no one does any business. So in both the cases there will
be no cheating, albeit for different reasons. This implies, that for different levels
of court quality between these two extreme values there will be different levels of
business activity. Therefore, a rigorous quantitative work is needed to evaluate the
importance of the court system on a country’s business environment.
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3 Data
3.1 Court Performance Data
Our study is based on a novel data set that represents year-wise administrative data
for over 200 districts, collected from the High Courts of the respective states. We
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Figure 1: Data Coverage
However, we use data from thirteen states for which our data coverage coincides
with the data coverage of enterprise data from Fourth All India Census 2006-07. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the only database which gives district level data on
pendency, number of cases disposed and instituted for several number of years. The
data on district courts that can be obtained from public domain such as National
Crime Record Bureau represents district court data aggregated at the state level.
The database has information on year wise information regarding the number
of civil cases pending at the beginning of the year, number of civil cases instituted
during a year, and the number of civil cases disposed during a year for several year
and districts. However, we do not know the nature of the cases. The data also pro-
vides information on the age breakup of pending cases, such as cases pending for 0-1,
1-5(or 1-3), 5-10(or 3-10) and more than 10(or 5) years. However, coverage is much
smaller for the age-breakup. Table 1 gives a summary of these variables. Using this
information, we construct measure of court inefficiency.
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Table 1: Court Summary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Pending in Start of the Year 4,076 10,920 14,520 0 171,505
Filed During Year 4,050 5,182 7,405 2 133,253
Solved During Year 4,049 4,996 7,553 2 140,943
Pending in End of the Year 4,094 11,058 14,513 2 157,607
Pending for < 1 Year 3,007 4,141 5,254 0 56,349
Pending for 1-5 Years 2,025 5,181 8,152 0 68,982
Pending for 5-10 Years 1,997 1,975 3,991 0 40,498
Pending for > 10 Years 2,909 1,040 2,027 0 22,954
Our main measure of court quality- duration index - that has been used in Chemin
[2009]. This index measures the number of years that judiciary would take to address
the backlog of cases. It is defined as the the ratio of number of cases pending (plus
the number of cases filed within the year) to the number of cases solved during a




where pt is the number of cases pending at the beginning of the year t, ft is the
number of cases filed in year t and dt is the number of cases disposed within year t.
For robustness check, we use disposition-time [Ingo et al, 2016] and expected
delay [Gordon, 1978] as alternative measures of judicial inefficiency. Besides these
traditional measures of court efficiency we also use a new index – the number of
old cases solved as a proportion of total number of cases – proposed and developed
in Chakraborty et al. [2018]. In that paper, Chakraborty et al. [2018] show that
there is considerable variation across districts with respect to this new index – some
courts solve older cases more than others. Even though it is only logical to solve
old backlogs first, the authors argue that courts that solve newer cases encourage
entrepreneurs who have started their business. Because they know, their contractual
issues which are brought to the court in the recent past, will not have to wait to get
resolved.
In the following figure 2, we present a comparison for three indices plotted on
district level maps of India. In particular, we plot duration, filing per capita and the
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new index – proportionate old cases solved. These different indices however, have
different units and value range. Hence, to make them comparable, we normalize them





Figure 2 plots the normalized indices for duration and the new index of fraction
of old cases solved for the year 2013. The darkeer zone represents regions with
higher court inefficiency. There are two things to be noted from the figure. First, the
coverage of duration was much broader than the new index. The reason is that for the
construction of the new index we need age distribution of cases and all high courts did
not give us the data. Therefore, the coverage of the new index is considerably less.
The second important point is that even though there is high correlation between
these two indices, they are not the same. There are districts with high duration rate




















Inefficiency Index : Duration 2013
Figure 2: Duration and New Index
Table 2 summarizes all the inefficiency indices that we are going to use in this
paper as measures of court inefficiency. Even here, one can see that the number of
data points are much less for the new index for the reason we detailed above. The
average values of duration, expected delay and disposition time are similar but the
ranges are quite different.
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Table 2: Court Inefficiency Index Summary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Duration 4,047 3.992 2.530 0.257 74
Expected Delay 4,047 2.930 2.414 0.00983 68
Disposition Time 4,048 2.986 2.531 0.0197 73
Proportionate Old Cases
Solved in Last five years
1,076 0.183 0.133 0.00163 0.954
3.2 Enterprise Data
We use Fourth All India Census for Medium, Small scale and Micro Enterprises,2006-
07 for our study (hereafter referred to as MSME data). There are around 158525
enterprises whose year of establishment ranges from 2000- 2007.
The survey round of firms is 2007. This implies that in 2007 we observe firms that
came into operation in various preceding years including 2007. However, for those
who started operations in 2007, they did not even have the full year to complete reg-
istration. Hence, we drop those firms from the sample which started operations in
2007.We also drop those where either year of registration or year of operation is miss-
ing. Thus, we cover around 172035 enterprises whose year of establishment ranges
from 2001-2006 from the districts for which we have information on court inefficiency.
For outcome variables we chose many firm-level variables which may get affected
by the level of court quality.To begin with, we looked at direct measures of formaliza-
tion such as delay in registration or an indicator variable telling whether the firm has
registered within 1 year since the start of operations.We also looked at various other
firm-level variables measuring scale of operations,indicating the degree of prevalence
of the informal network and the strength of the contract enforcement mechanism in
place as well as some firm performance variables. The details of each of the variables
are given below.
Delay in registration- It is the time gap between year of registration and year of
initial production of an enterprise. It is measured in years. It is any number greater
than or equal to zero. The registration works as a proxy for working in a formal
set up which includes formal contracting. Therefore, with more efficient courts, we
expect the firms register sooner.
11
Same Year Registration- We consider delay of over one year as the real delay.
Thus, we construct a binary variable which takes value 1 when the firm experiences
delay of upto one year and zero otherwise.
Micro- The sample was divided into - Micro, Small and Medium based on the
original value of P&M into three quantiles. Following this, we construct an indicator
variable Micro. This variable takes value 1 when it is a micro firm and 0 when it is
small or medium.
Total Employees- It is a variable for the financial year 2006-07. It is any number
greater than or equal to zero.
Loan Status- It is a binary variable which takes value 1 when the firm has taken
any loan and 0 otherwise.We do not have information on the year when the loan was
taken.
Fraction of female/child employee- There is information on the number of
employees who are female or children. We create a variable fraction of female or
child employee by dividing the sum of the number of employees who are female and
children by total number of employees. The variable is for the financial year 2006-07.
Fraction of SC/ST employee- There is information on the number of employees
who are SC or ST. We create a variable fraction of SC/ST employee by dividing the
sum of the number of employees who are SC/ST by total number of employees.The
variable is also available for the financial year 2006-07.
Minimum wage status- We calculate average wage of the firm by dividing total
wage bill in the year 2006-07 by total number of employees in 2006-07. Following
this, we calculate mean wage offered in a state. We then construct a binary variable
indicating whether the average wage of a firm in a state is less than the mean wage
of that state. The variable is available for the financial year 2006-07.





We construct a binary variable indicating whether the firm is involved in manu-
facturing or non-manufacturing unit. The variable takes value 1 when it is involved
in a non-manufacturing unit.
Same Year Production- The indicator variable will take value 1 when the firm
starts operating within one year of installation of their plant and machinery (P&M)
and 0 otherwise.
Exporting Status- We simply construct a binary variable Exporting Unit which
takes value 1 when the firm is exporting and 0 when it is not exporting.
Value of Exports- The database has information on the value of exports of an
exporting firm for two financial years- 2005-06 and 2006-07.
Growth in Value of Exports- The database has information on net-worth for
the years 2005-06 and 2006-07. Therefore, we compute growth in log of net-worth
between 2005-06 & 2006-07.
Fraction of employees of same gender as that of the owner- The variable
calculates proportion of employees belonging to same gender as that of the owner of
the firm.
Fraction of employees of same gender as that of the manager- The variable
calculates proportion of female and male employee when manager is female and male
respectively.
Owner-Manager Same Gender- The variable takes value 1 when both manager
and owner are of same gender and 0 other-wise.
Gross Value Added- The databse has information on GVA for three financial
years- 2004-05, 2005-06 and 2006-07.
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Growth in Net-worth- The database has information on net-worth for the years
2005-06 and 2006-07. Therefore, we compute growth in log of net-worth between
2005-06 & 2006-07.
Table 3 summarises all firm-performance variables for the whole sample. We then
summarize the information for rural and urban sample separately in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 3: Summary of Firm Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Delay in Registration 172,035 0.675 1.298 0 7
Same Year Registration 172,035 0.834 0.372 0 1
Micro 146,619 0.356 0.479 0 1
Firm Size 172,035 5.038 23.95 0 5,475
Loan 172,035 0.146 0.353 0 1
Fraction of female and child employees 157,570 0.261 0.392 0 1
Fraction of SC/ST employees 172,031 0.129 0.280 0 1
Whether wage is below the mean wage 151,561 0.745 0.436 0 1
Owner Manger of Same Gender 172,035 0.929 0.257 0 1
Fraction Employees of same gender as that of owner 172,031 0.843 0.304 0 1
Fraction Employees of same gender as that of owner 172,031 0.869 0.271 0 1
Non Manufacturing Enterprise 172,035 0.439 0.496 0 1
Operational Lag in Years 138,031 0.0296 0.212 0 6
Same Year Production 138,031 0.997 0.0511 0 1
Exporting 172,035 0.0146 0.120 0 1
Average Growth in Networth between 2005 and 2007 159,805 0.0125 0.186 -1 24.06
GVA 483,511 11.40 1.634 0 23.03
Average Growth in Exports between 2005 and 2007 1,069 0.0884 0.929 -1 21.25
VOE 4,177 10.39 6.385 0 22.52
There were approximately 84 per cent firms which got registered within one year
of commencing its operations. Around 35 percent were micro in nature. The average
firm size in terms of the number of employees was 5 and only 19 per cent firms were
willing to expand. The proprotion of firms offering wages below the mean wage at
the state level was as high as 75%. Most of the firm-owners preferred to hire em-
ployees(inlcuding manager) of the same gender. There were 44% non-manufacturing
and 1.5% exporting units in the sample. Lastly, firms were noted to grow by 1.2%
in terms of networth and 8.8% in terms of value of exports between 2005 and 2007.
We expect entrepreneurial decisions to be affected by owner-specific characteris-
tics such as techinical knowledge and social identity of the owner. The social identity
of the owner of the enterprise includes caste, gender, religion. Also, location of the
14
Table 4: Summary of Firm Performance- Rural
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Delay in Registration 73,625 0.659 1.265 0 7
Same Year Registration 73,625 0.841 0.366 0 1
Micro 63,568 0.388 0.487 0 1
Firm Size 73,625 5.367 33.01 0 5,475
Loan 73,625 0.189 0.391 0 1
Fraction of female and child employees 66,143 0.265 0.398 0 1
Fraction of SC/ST employees 73,621 0.162 0.314 0 1
Whether wage is below the mean wage 63,975 0.797 0.402 0 1
Owner Manger of Same Gender 73,625 0.934 0.248 0 1
Fraction Employees of same gender as that of owner 73,621 0.846 0.303 0 1
Fraction Employees of same gender as that of owner 73,621 0.869 0.275 0 1
Non Manufacturing Enterprise 73,625 0.419 0.493 0 1
Operational Lag in Years 60,194 0.0276 0.208 0 6
Same Year Production 60,194 0.997 0.0528 0 1
Exporting 73,625 0.0143 0.119 0 1
Average Growth in Networth between 2005 and 2007 67,661 0.0147 0.258 -1 21.04
GVA 205,553 11.29 1.583 0 22.90
Average Growth in Exports between 2005 and 2007 390 0.155 1.354 -1 21.25
VOE 1,655 9.445 6.245 0 22.52
Table 5: Summary of Firm Performance- Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Delay in Registration 98,410 0.686 1.322 0 7
Same Year Registration 98,410 0.829 0.377 0 1
Micro 83,051 0.332 0.471 0 1
Firm Size 98,410 4.791 13.68 1 900
Loan 98,410 0.114 0.318 0 1
Fraction of female and child employees 91,427 0.259 0.388 0 1
Fraction of SC/ST employees 98,410 0.105 0.249 0 1
Whether wage is below the mean wage 87,586 0.706 0.455 0 1
Owner Manger of Same Gender 98,410 0.925 0.264 0 1
Fraction Employees of same gender as that of owner 98,410 0.840 0.305 0 1
Fraction Employees of same gender as that of owner 98,410 0.870 0.269 0 1
Non Manufacturing Enterprise 98,410 0.455 0.498 0 1
Operational Lag in Years 77,837 0.0311 0.216 0 6
Same Year Production 77,837 0.998 0.0499 0 1
Exporting 98,410 0.0148 0.121 0 1
Average Growth in Networth between 2005 and 2007 92,144 0.0110 0.105 -1 24.06
GVA 277,958 11.49 1.666 0 23.03
Average Growth in Exports between 2005 and 2007 679 0.0502 0.551 -1 8.229
VOE 2,522 11.01 6.401 0 22.52
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enterprise- rural or urban is likely to influence the firm performance. Hence, we
include those as controls in our specification.
Table 6 presents the summary statistics on owner-specific characteristics. It is
seen that there are only 17 per cent firms with some technical knowledge. Other
Backward Class formed the dominating group in terms of caste. Most of the owners
belonged to Hindu religion and were males. However, the firms were almost equally
distributed in rural and urban sector.
Table 6: Owner Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Techincal Know How 172,035 0.151 0.358 0 1
SC 172,035 0.0857 0.280 0 1
ST 172,035 0.0155 0.123 0 1
OBC 172,035 0.540 0.498 0 1
Hindu 172,035 0.862 0.345 0 1
Male 172,035 0.741 0.438 0 1
Male Manager 172,035 0.774 0.418 0 1
Rural 172,035 0.428 0.495 0 1
Table 7 and 8 summarises this information based on the location of the enterprise-
rural or urban.
Table 7: Owner Characteristics- Rural
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Techincal Know How 73,625 0.141 0.348 0 1
SC 73,625 0.106 0.308 0 1
ST 73,625 0.0198 0.139 0 1
OBC 73,625 0.503 0.500 0 1
Hindu 73,625 0.856 0.351 0 1
Male 73,625 0.741 0.438 0 1
Male Manager 73,625 0.770 0.421 0 1
We find that in rural India as well as urban, almost three-fourths of the owners are
male. We also see that most of the business are dominated by Hindus. In rural India,
86% of the firm owners are Hindu while in urban India 87% are Hindu. However,
when we look at the caste categories, the business ownership is dominated by Other
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Table 8: Owner Characteristics- Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Techincal Know How 98,410 0.158 0.365 0 1
SC 98,410 0.0705 0.256 0 1
ST 98,410 0.0122 0.110 0 1
OBC 98,410 0.567 0.496 0 1
Hindu 98,410 0.867 0.340 0 1
Male 98,410 0.741 0.438 0 1
Male Manager 98,410 0.778 0.416 0 1
Backward Castes (OBC).In both rural and urban areas, around 50% are owned by
members of OBC. Members of general caste groups own around 41% of business in
rural areas and 37% of that in urban areas. Members of scheduled caste and tribe
own around 12% of business in rural areas and around 8% in urban areas.
4 Empirical Method
For our study, we merge the information on district level measure of court quality
for any year t with the year of operations t of any firm i located in district d from
MSME data yielding district-year as our panel unit.The unit of analysis is any firm
i clustered in district d and year t.To start with,we looked at how delay in registra-
tion captured by the difference between the year of establishment and the year of
registration varies in response to change in court quality.For different firms,these two
years may be different even if the delay may be the same. For example, compare
two firms from the same district. One is established in 2000 and registered in 2002.
while the other is established in 2002 and registered in 2004. In both cases the delay
is of 2 years. But in the first case delay is regressed on court inefficiency in year 2000
and in the second case it is regressed on the court inefficiency in the year 2002.
However, the variable delay suffers from the problem of over-sampling. To elabo-
rate, a firm commencing its operations in 2001 has full six years to register. However
given the 2007 MSME round of data, a firm which began its operations in 2006 has
only two years to register. In other words, over the years, we will be over-sampling
firms with smaller delay.Thus, our main firm level outcome variable is same year reg-
istration which addresses the problem of over sampling to a large extent.This variable
indicates that whether the firm gets registered within one year of establishment of
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the firm.
For same year registration measure our model takes the following form:
δidt = α + β1Xdt + β2Zidt + β3Dd + β4Dt + ui (1)
where, δidt is the probability of same year registration. Xdt is the court quality
index for district d at time t which will be same for all firms located in the same
district and established in the same year.Zid are firm specific controls that account
for gender of the owner and manager of the firm, religion and caste identities of
the owner in explaining delay and are time invariant.a firm may experience a higher
probability of getting registered within one year in districts where institutional qual-
ity is good. However,institutional quality simultaneously depends on the economic
prosperity of an area. Hence, we include district fixed effects to control for any un-
observed heterogeneity.
Thus, our identification strategy considers the variability in court inefficiency
within a district. We also include time fixed effects to control for common shocks
across all districts. Likewise, it may happen that firms located in the same district
and established in the same year experience peer effects due to common shocks.
Thus, the firm level error terms are not i.i.d. Consequently, any firm level un-
explained variation within a district in that year might be understated, resulting in
inflated t-statistics. We therefore cluster the error terms creating district-year groups
to account for this fact.
For the other outcome variables for which we can utilize the panel data, we will
follow the same specification. Hence we make use of the panel data methodology in
the context of variables related to sunk cost and exporting status of a firm.
On the other hand,variables like firm size, indicator of loan status and variables
related to contract enforcement as well as average performance of a firm involve
cross-section specification.The analysis takes the following form
nid = α + β1Xd + Ziβ2 + uid (2)
More specifically, the decision to take a loan is regressed on average judicial in-
efficiency that a firm experienced since it commenced its operations.The contract
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enforcement related variables were regressed on previous years court inefficiency.
Lastly, growth in net-worth of the firm was also regressed on average court quality.
Since firms located in the same district might experience similar patterns in deciding




The main part of the empirical analysis focuses on the relationship between legal
efficiency and same year registration in a business. The variable same year reg-
istration of a firm indicates that whether the firm gets registered within one year
from the year it started production. Our baseline regression presented in Table 9
where same year registration is regressed on duration rate and other control variables.
In column 1, we only use duration as the independent variable without any con-
trols and find that court inefficiency has a negative impact on the probability of
same year registration meaning that if the enterprises are from the districts with
high duration rate, they are less likely to register within one year of commencing
its operations.We interpret the probability of not registering within one year as an
indicator of their low perceived pay-offs from registering with the formal authorities
which we argue that comes from low trust on the formal institutions. Such low trust
on formal institutions comes from weak performance of courts in that district.
Following this, we introduce a set of owner characteristics. In column 2, we
include an indicator variable which represents technical know-how of the owner.
Column 3 includes controls on social identity of the owner namely the caste of the
owner.Specifically, in column 3, we compare SC, ST and OBC castes in relation to
our reference category of general. It is possible that districts that have more effi-
cient judiciary encourage higher participation of socially dis-advantaged groups in
entrepreneurship. However, if socially disadvantaged groups are less efficient than the
other entrepreneurs then they might take a longer time to get their firms registered.
For instance, registration might be a costly procedure both in terms of information
acquisition as well as pure monetary costs. Entrepreneurs who are at a disadvan-
tage might take more time to afford high costs as well as gather the right information.
19
For a similar argument, we control for religion. However, the inclusion of the reli-
gion indicator does not affect the correlation between legal inefficiency and business
inefficiency beyond the ones captured by caste.
Since, labour-force participation rate of men in general is much higher than that
of women in India, it is possible that gender of firm-owner affects the decision-making
to a large extent. For instance, formal institutions, courts in this case, might facili-
tate business operations more for women entrepreneurs, who are less likely to get the
benefits from informal networks dominated by men. For a similar reason, we control
for the gender of the manager of a firm in column 6. Our base category is female.
We find that magnitude of the coefficient of interest increases further with a control
for the gender of the manager and owner.
Finally, we add rural dummy in column 7 (which equals one when the enterprise
is rural) and find that chances of urban enterprises registering within one year are
lower when compared to rural counterparts. This could be due to less complicated
framework of firms and stronger informal networking advantages in rural areas than
urban areas where firms could have highly complex structure in addition to diffused
community ties which deepens with development.
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Table 9: Baseline Regression
Dependent Variable: Same Year Registration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)





Duration in the Year of Operations -0.007558* -0.007562* -0.007464* -0.007467* -0.007483* -0.007522* -0.007487*
(0.004070) (0.004075) (0.004057) (0.004057) (0.004044) (0.004041) (0.004043)
Owner Characteristics
Techincal Know How -0.008585 -0.008268 -0.008224 -0.007881 -0.007994 -0.007536
(0.01146) (0.01152) (0.01150) (0.01158) (0.01155) (0.01151)
SC -0.02384*** -0.02342*** -0.02236** -0.02170** -0.02344***
(0.008783) (0.008812) (0.008769) (0.008772) (0.008803)
ST -0.01425 -0.01406 -0.01382 -0.01341 -0.01521
(0.01455) (0.01457) (0.01461) (0.01456) (0.01448)
OBC -0.02126*** -0.02094*** -0.02153*** -0.02163*** -0.02210***
(0.007832) (0.007905) (0.007940) (0.007920) (0.007996)
Hindu -0.004130 -0.003488 -0.003509 -0.003958
(0.004502) (0.004522) (0.004519) (0.004519)
Male 0.02661*** 0.006647 0.006370
(0.007644) (0.007598) (0.007582)




Year = 2001 0.1340*** 0.1340*** 0.1342*** 0.1342*** 0.1348*** 0.1350*** 0.1348***
(0.02075) (0.02074) (0.02068) (0.02068) (0.02054) (0.02050) (0.02046)
Year = 2002 0.1328*** 0.1329*** 0.1332*** 0.1332*** 0.1346*** 0.1351*** 0.1350***
(0.02001) (0.02001) (0.01997) (0.01997) (0.01988) (0.01985) (0.01983)
Year = 2003 0.1276*** 0.1277*** 0.1277*** 0.1277*** 0.1300*** 0.1308*** 0.1304***
(0.02042) (0.02042) (0.02035) (0.02035) (0.02017) (0.02014) (0.02007)
Year = 2004 0.1437*** 0.1439*** 0.1441*** 0.1440*** 0.1466*** 0.1473*** 0.1470***
(0.02132) (0.02138) (0.02134) (0.02133) (0.02115) (0.02115) (0.02111)
Year = 2005 0.2729*** 0.2730*** 0.2729*** 0.2729*** 0.2764*** 0.2774*** 0.2766***
(0.02207) (0.02208) (0.02203) (0.02202) (0.02197) (0.02197) (0.02193)
Year = 2006 0.3331*** 0.3332*** 0.3328*** 0.3328*** 0.3362*** 0.3372*** 0.3366***
(0.02297) (0.02298) (0.02294) (0.02293) (0.02289) (0.02286) (0.02281)
Constant 0.6962*** 0.6974*** 0.7105*** 0.7139*** 0.6920*** 0.6850*** 0.6789***
(0.02382) (0.02362) (0.02450) (0.02384) (0.02427) (0.02467) (0.02494)
Observations 156,190 156,190 156,190 156,190 156,190 156,190 156,190
R-squared 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.183 0.183 0.183
District FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
5.2 Heterogeneity
We next want to identify for whom court efficiency matters more. Specifically, we
conduct the test based on- owner level characteristics which is based on caste of the
entrepreneur and network density where the entrepreneur is located.
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5.2.1 Caste
Given the historical occupational bindings of the caste system in India, it is well
established that occupational mobility across different caste groups is typically very
low in India. In such a setup, formal judicial system has an important role to play
in economics mobility of marginalized castes. Traditionally, individuals rely on own
caste network to start a new enterprise. A network can not only provide important
information needed to start a new enterprise but also provide loan and ensure en-
forceability of contracts that are required for a business. However, if an individual
defects from the traditional occupation then he/she cannot depend on his informal
caste network for any future help in terms of loans or contractors to work with.
Hence, most individuals tend to stick to the industry that is in the traditional oc-
cupational category of his/her caste. However, in the presence of a strong judicial
system it is easy for someone to write contracts without the help of his caste network.
The anecdotes regarding experiences of successful Dalit entrepreneurs like Devanand
Londhe and Ratibhai Makwana hint at such favourable role of formalization. Their
transition from ”job seekers” to ”job givers” would not have been possible had there
not been a strong judicial system to ease out the process of writing formal business
contract. For this reason we argue that a formal judicial system is likely to be more
helpful for disadvantaged sections of the society who traditionally do not have a
very strong informal network to bank on. Accordingly, in Table 12, we test whether
delay in registration systematically vary with court inefficiency and caste identity of
the owner.Hence, we include an interaction term involving both caste identity and
duration rate in the regression term. We test the significance of court inefficiency
for SC/STs for rual and urban separately. We find that the coefficient of the inter-
action term is negative and significant for the urban sample. This implies that court
inefficiency is worse for entrepreneurs if they hail from disadvantaged groups.
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Table 10: Heterogeneity Analysis Based on Caste
Dependent Variable: Same Year Registration
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Rural Urban
Duration in the Year of Operations -0.008595* -0.008542
(0.005029) (0.005782)
SC or ST 0.001927 0.01110
(0.01179) (0.01580)
SC or ST x Court Inefficiency -0.001619 -0.007384**
(0.002933) (0.003620)
Owner Characteristics




Male Manager 0.01583* 0.03557***
(0.008623) (0.01166)
Year = 2001 0.1111*** 0.1569***
(0.01941) (0.02709)
Year = 2002 0.1149*** 0.1449***
(0.01985) (0.02666)
Year = 2003 0.1136*** 0.1431***
(0.02134) (0.02730)
Year = 2004 0.1242*** 0.1566***
(0.01943) (0.03067)
Year = 2005 0.2429*** 0.3020***
(0.01969) (0.03085)






District FE YES YES
Time FE YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
5.2.2 Network strength and formal courts
In the last section we argue that the reason that improvements in courts help SC/ST
more because they lack business network which could help them enforcing contracts
as it happens with traditional business castes. If our conjecture is correct then court
efficiency will help SC/ST entrepreneurs more where the network size is smaller. It is
difficult to measure the extent of SC/ST network in a district. Therefore, we proxy
it with the SC/ST population in the district. The year of survey is 2007 which falls
somewhat midway between two census years 2001 and 2011. Therefore, we measure
the district SC/ST population by taking the average of SC/ST population in that
district in census years 2001 and 2011. Then we categorize a district to be high
SC/ST district if the SC/ST population of that district is greater than the average
and low SC/ST district otherwise. The results reported in table (11) supports our
conjecture.
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Table 11: SC/ST Heterogeneity Based on Caste Proportion









Duration in the Year of Operations -0.001386 -0.01100
(0.007135) (0.008940)
SC or ST -0.03494 0.03016*
(0.02954) (0.01724)
SC or ST x Court Inefficiency 3.974e-05 -0.009514**
(0.006911) (0.004035)
Owner Characteristics






Male Manager 0.004600 0.04436***
(0.01418) (0.01294)
Year = 2001 0.1154*** 0.1625***
(0.03854) (0.03239)
Year = 2002 0.1231*** 0.1488***
(0.03774) (0.03187)
Year = 2003 0.1353*** 0.1420***
(0.03910) (0.03225)
Year = 2004 0.1254*** 0.1663***
(0.03458) (0.03766)
Year = 2005 0.2493*** 0.3157***
(0.03564) (0.03791)






District FE YES YES
Time FE YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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6 Robustness check
6.1 Different indicators of court efficiency
6.1.1 Disposition time and expected delay
For robustness check, we utilise our extensive data to construct alternate measures of
judicial inefficiency. We test the sensitivity of our results in Table 9 to these alternate
measures of inefficiency. Table.. report the results from using two other indices i.e.
disposition time and expected delay with same year registration as the dependent
variable. The results are in consent with the main measure of court inefficiency.2






Expected Delay in the Year of Operations -0.008060*
(0.004432)
Disposition Time in the Year of Operations -0.007166*
(0.004111)
Owner Characteristics
















Year = 2001 0.1348*** 0.1350***
(0.02045) (0.02045)
Year = 2002 0.1350*** 0.1353***
(0.01983) (0.01981)
Year = 2003 0.1306*** 0.1308***
(0.02006) (0.02004)
Year = 2004 0.1469*** 0.1474***
(0.02110) (0.02106)
Year = 2005 0.2766*** 0.2772***
(0.02191) (0.02196)






District FE YES YES
Time FE YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
2We have included results with the remaining firm-related variables in the appendix
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6.1.2 New Index: Proportion of old cases solved
In Table 10 we regress same year registration on the newly constructed index. This
index covers districts having information on age breakup of pending cases in 1-5
years format for the period 2005-2007. However, we conduct regression analysis only
for the years 2005 and 2006. Column 2 includes the results from duration for the
smaller sample consisting of same number of observations for which the new index
is used. Following this, Column 3 includes results with the new index as the main
variable of interest.
The motivation to construct the new index is based on the argument that two
districts with same duration might differ in the composition of the old cases that
they dispose. Hence, we control for this possibility by including duration as one of
the controls in the final column.
We argue that proportionate old cases solved will discourage business growth
and therefore, we expect that it will have a negative impact on different measures
of business performance. Our empirical result reported in table (13) confirms our
conjecture. Furthermore, we note that unlike other measures which bear almost
equal coefficients, the new index has a much higher coefficient. The difference can be
explained in terms of wealth of information on court performance that the new index
reveals to the prospective entrepreneur. In other words, we argue that entrepreneur
would be encouraged to take a decision to formalise his establishment faster in dis-
tricts where he expects his case to be solved first.3 It is worthwhile to mention that
the results revealed interesting patterns which were in contrast to the existing indices
for some variables, thus, offering us an opportunity to study the relationship between
court inefficiency and entreprenurial decision-making in a greater detail.
3We have included results with the remaining firm-related variables in the appendix.
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Table 13: New Index and Duration
New Index and Duration
Dependent Variable: Same Year Registration
(1) (2) (3) (4)






Proportion of old cases solved in last five years -0.3138*** -0.2149**
(0.1173) (0.08610)
Duration in the Year of Operations -0.007487* -0.03108** -0.02714*
(0.004043) (0.01474) (0.01468)
Owner Characteristics
Techincal Know How -0.007536 -0.008917 -0.008801 -0.009140
(0.01151) (0.008748) (0.008767) (0.008753)
SC -0.02344*** 0.001402 0.001310 0.001176
(0.008803) (0.007387) (0.007388) (0.007389)
ST -0.01521 0.01802* 0.01718 0.01758*
(0.01448) (0.01043) (0.01049) (0.01042)
OBC -0.02210*** 0.003982 0.004137 0.003965
(0.007996) (0.005149) (0.005125) (0.005138)
Hindu -0.003958 -0.006326 -0.006029 -0.006235
(0.004519) (0.006592) (0.006609) (0.006604)
Male 0.006370 4.342e-04 9.929e-04 5.986e-04
(0.007582) (0.006191) (0.006170) (0.006196)
Male Manager 0.02790*** -0.01089 -0.01139 -0.01113
(0.007978) (0.007353) (0.007325) (0.007364)
Rural 0.01583*** 0.01114*** 0.01087*** 0.01095***
(0.005900) (0.003799) (0.003794) (0.003791)
Year = 2001 0.1348***
(0.02046)
Year = 2002 0.1350***
(0.01983)
Year = 2003 0.1304***
(0.02007)
Year = 2004 0.1470***
(0.02111)
Year = 2005 0.2766***
(0.02193)
Year = 2006 0.3366*** 0.06485*** 0.06322*** 0.06330***
(0.02281) (0.008035) (0.008149) (0.008010)
Constant 0.6789*** 1.0346*** 0.9892*** 1.0572***
(0.02494) (0.04663) (0.02186) (0.04656)
Observations 156,190 25,679 25,679 25,679
R-squared 0.183 0.166 0.164 0.167
District FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
*:Full Sample
**:Coinciding Sample
***:No Control for duration
****: Duration is controlled
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6.2 Different indicators of firm performance
Overall, the results reported in the section above suggest that a more efficient judi-
ciary helps businesses to operate in the formal sector, possibly by reducing the cost
of formalization. We now look at other firm level variables that may also be linked
to the court quality.
6.2.1 Scale of Operations
Table (14) looks at two measures of the scale of the enterprise.The first variable is
the decision of firm to operate as a micro unit and the second one measures the
size of a firm proxied by the number of employees hired. Since larger organizations
are expected to face contract enforcement problems, a more efficient legal system is
likely to help in the establishment of a larger set-up.Results in the table confirm the
same.In column 1, we find that firms are more likely to operate as a micro enterprise
when court inefficiency is high. While in column 2, we find that as court inefficiency
increases, number of employees hired declines. Both the results are consistent with
our hypothesis.
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Table 14: Scale of Operations
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Micro Firm Size
Court inefficiency (duration) in the Year of Installation 0.006108**
(0.002635)
Court inefficiency (duration) in 2005 -0.3086**
(0.1440)
Owner Characteristics
















Year = 2001 -0.02057*
(0.01189)
Year = 2002 -0.01411
(0.01157)
Year = 2003 -0.04321***
(0.01069)
Year = 2004 -0.04817***
(0.01119)
Year = 2005 -0.05560***
(0.01168)






District FE YES NO
Time FE YES NO
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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6.2.2 Availability of loans
We next look at how court inefficiency impacts loan availability. We expect
that as courts get better enforcing loan contracts will be easier and the lenders will
be more willing to lend money. As a result, in equilibrium, efficient courts will have
a positive impact on loan status (and inefficient courts will have a negative impact).
The relevant variable is a binary variable that takes value 1 when firm takes a loan
and 0 otherwise. However, there is no information on the year when the loan was
taken, hence, we regress the loan status of the firm on the average court inefficiency
that it experiences since it started its production. Results are presented in Table
15.As expected, we find that a firm is less likely to take a loan when average court
inefficiency is low.
Table 15: Financial Access
(1)
VARIABLES Loan Status
Average court inefficiency since operations -0.01130***
(0.003341)
Owner Characteristics






















Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
6.2.3 Hiring practice
Next, Table 16 looks at how the firm’s hiring decision gets affected by court quality.
We observe the effect of court quality on three relevant variables: the proportion
of female and child employee, the proportion of SC/ST employees and whether the
employer is paying less than the optimal wage. Our premise is that in a country
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like India which does not have a strong legal institutions, employers tend to exploit
their workers by denying them fair wage, leaves and other facilities. In districts with
stronger courts, employers are less likely to get away with these illegal activities.
Hence, in those places they are going to employ workers from the vulnerable section
of the society who do not have access to justice in case of any unfair treatment. Also,
in those districts, the chance of paying higher wage is high. The results in table 16
supports our hypothesis – as court system improves (inefficiency falls), there is a
tendency to employ more labour from women/children and SC/ST. Also, as court
improves the employers tend to pay higher than mean wage prevailing in the state.
.










Court inefficiency (Duration) in 2005 -0.01761** -0.003016* 0.01468*
(0.008625) (0.001612) (0.007702)
Owner Characteristics
Techincal Know How -0.06811** -0.005700 0.009660
(0.03322) (0.007386) (0.02747)
SC -0.04893 0.5324*** 0.06103***
(0.05080) (0.02926) (0.02140)
ST -0.07182 0.3957*** 0.04900**
(0.05859) (0.05212) (0.02313)
OBC -0.03683 -0.05107*** -0.01129
(0.04826) (0.007864) (0.03109)
Hindu -0.04523 0.03781*** -0.03587*
(0.09802) (0.007158) (0.01823)
Male -0.1629*** 0.003622 -0.05650**
(0.03208) (0.006606) (0.02684)
Male Manager -0.5127*** 0.01279 -0.07312***
(0.03583) (0.007793) (0.02279)
Rural 0.03787 0.03251*** 0.08434***
(0.02305) (0.005322) (0.02287)
Constant 0.9297*** 0.06056*** 0.7915***
(0.1353) (0.009856) (0.03669)
Observations 147,294 160,271 140,989
R-squared 0.003 0.354 0.032
District FE NO NO NO
Time FE NO NO NO
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
6.2.4 Long term investment
We argue that court quality has effect on long term investment decisions of the firms.
Long term investments often involve sunk costs which cannot be retrieved in the long
run. We conjecture that in presence of efficient court system, firms are encouraged
to take such decisions as they expect to survive in the long run. There is no straight
forward way to measure such sunk costs. We propose two candidate measurements
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for this – entrepreneurs decision to start a manufacturing unit and no delay in pro-
duction.
Setting up a manufacturing firm involves investment in plant and machinery
which is difficult to sell-off if an entrepreneur decides to exit. We argue that this
high exit cost makes entrepreneurs invest in manufacturing only if the courts are
efficient i.e. contracts can be enforced easily. The second measure we take is same
year production – i.e the year of set up is the same as the year of first production.
We argue that beginning production requires some set up cost. If court system is
inefficient, the entrepreneurs will face more uncertainly and they would like to wait
before staring production in order to get a hold of the contractual environment.
The results in table 17 are in accordance with our expectations. Column 1 in
table 17 indicates that as court inefficiency increases, probability of the firm to
operate as a manufacturing-unit declined. While in Column 2 we find that as court
inefficiency increases, probability of firm to initiate its production in the same year
as that of installation (i.e. not experiencing sunk costs) increases, although the result
is insignificant.
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Year = 2001 0.01226 -8.693e-04
(0.01168) (6.786e-04)
Year = 2002 0.005740 -7.153e-04
(0.009177) (6.900e-04)
Year = 2003 0.007493 9.025e-04
(0.01012) (7.369e-04)
Year = 2004 -0.02974*** 0.003923***
(0.009984) (6.353e-04)
Year = 2005 -0.03986*** 0.004435***
(0.01237) (6.770e-04)






District FE YES NO
Time FE YES NO
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
6.2.5 Same Network Employees
Next we explore the association between court efficiency and the degree of the
prevalance of informal networks. When the formal court system is weak, the firms
would rely more on the alternate informal network and connections to recruit em-
ployees from their own network. Caste, religion and gender are the most common
basis for formation of such informal networks. In the absence of the information
on caste and religion of the owner we concentrate only on gender here.We expect
the firm-owner or manager to employ a higher fraction of employees from the same
gender group when court inefficiency increases.Similarly, we expect probability of
manager and gender to be same when court inefficiency is high.This is because when
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court inefficiency increases the owner/manager would expect a lower probability of
breach of contract when they hire same gender employees. Table 19 reveals the same.
The results indicate that a formal institution is replaced by strong informal networks
when formal courts do not work well.
















Court inefficiency (Duration) in 2005 0.01002*** 0.01016*** 0.003088**
(0.003337) (0.003439) (0.001390)
Owner Characteristics
Techincal Know How -0.008750 -0.003317 -0.01298**
(0.009280) (0.008738) (0.006387)
SC 0.07102*** 0.05806*** 0.03304***
(0.01172) (0.01302) (0.005299)
ST 0.05077*** 0.03672*** 0.008609
(0.01136) (0.01264) (0.006635)
OBC 0.05301*** 0.03747*** 0.02578***
(0.01246) (0.01342) (0.005928)
Hindu -0.009057 -0.02212*** 0.01364
(0.01275) (0.007686) (0.01212)
Male 0.4401*** -0.008877 0.4744***
(0.04410) (0.01576) (0.05544)
Male Manager -0.2953*** 0.1304*** -0.3823***
(0.03679) (0.03059) (0.05409)
Rural -0.001578 -0.005301 0.006193
(0.009462) (0.009266) (0.004640)
Constant 0.6881*** 0.7398*** 0.8331***
(0.03741) (0.03298) (0.02588)
Observations 160,271 160,271 160,275
R-squared 0.166 0.046 0.232
District FE NO NO NO
Time FE NO NO NO
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
6.2.6 Firm Performance
Finally we analyse the effect of court efficiency on various measures of firm level
performance.The database has information on the GVA and net-worth of firms for
three and two years respectively. We first regressed GVA of each firm on court
inefficiency. The results wturned out to be insignificant. Following this, we calculated
the growth in net-worth between these two years and regressed the same on the
average court inefficiency experienced in the lag years. We expect net-worth to
decline from the previous year when court inefficiency in the district is high. Results
presented in Table 20 confirm our expectations.
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Table 19: Firm Performance
(1) (2)




Average Duration b/w 2004 and 2005 -6.239e-04*
(3.728e-04)
Owner Characteristics
















NIC1 = 1 0.005568
(0.005393)
NIC1 = 2 0.007610
(0.005927)
NIC1 = 3 0.01004
(0.007767)
NIC1 = 4 0.2250
(0.2298)
NIC1 = 5 0.006373
(0.005185)
NIC1 = 6 0.01493
(0.01745)
NIC1 = 7 0.003068
(0.004957)
NIC1 = 8 0.003790
(0.004820)
NIC1 = 9 0.005399
(0.004893)
Year = 2005 0.1104***
(0.005427)






District FE YE NO
Time FE YES NO
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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7 Court efficiency and industrial heterogeneity
We conjecture that if court is inefficient, there will be a general uncertainty regard-
ing contract enforcement. In this situation, entrepreneurs will diversify in different
business to hedge against the risk. Moreover, in absence of an effective court system,
firms depend on their local network to enforce contract. This encourages them to
source their input locally leading to higher diversification in business. In order to
capture industrial heterogeneity we compute an industry analogue of the fraction-
alization index developed by Alesina et al. [2003] using the following formula. The
index essentially indicated the probability that two randomly selected individuals
from a population belonged to different groups.






Where sij is the share of industry i (i= 1.. N) in district j. We conduct the
analysis by calculating the share of firms in each industry in district ’d’ and time
’t’. We then calculate the fractionalization Index from the same which then yields
district-year level information on fractionalization.
Since the database has classified firms using five digit industry classification, we
can do the analysis for NIC 1,2.. 5 digit codes.
To begin with NIC 1-digit code, there are 9 industries as per NIC-1-digit codes.
Hence, we need to calculate share of each of the 9 industries in each district-year
group. Following this we compute Herfindahl Index which is then deducted from 1
to yield fractionalization variable which is at district-time level. We follow similar
steps to compute heterogeneity index for all five levels of classification. The fraction-
alization index at each level is then regressed on court inefficiency with the aim to
study the relationship between institutional quality and distribution of firms across
various industries.
The dependent variable is district-year level fractionalisation index for different
districts and years. The variable of interest is district level court inefficiency which
varies within district over the years. Controls include share of SCs, STs, OBCs,
Males as the owner of the firms at district-time level. Similarly, we include controls
for share of firms with male manager and located in rural sector in that district-year
group. Since all the variables are distributed across space and time, we include dis-
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trict fixed-effects. Thus, our specification is as follows:
Hdt = α + β1Xdt + β2Zdt + β3Dd + ui
Table 21 includes results for the same.
Table 20: Industrial Heterogeneity and Court efficiency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES One Digit Two Digit Three Digit Four Digit Five Digit
Court inefficiency (duration) in the Year of Operations 0.002754* 0.003086** 0.003008* 0.002899* 0.002607*
(0.001417) (0.001531) (0.001548) (0.001533) (0.001543)
Share of SC Owners 0.1059** 0.06491 0.04506 0.04261 0.05563
(0.04851) (0.05244) (0.05300) (0.05252) (0.05284)
Share of ST Owners 0.09641* 0.1118** 0.08658 0.09355 0.08706
(0.05257) (0.05683) (0.05743) (0.05691) (0.05725)
Share of OBC Owners 0.09368*** 0.06755** 0.06969** 0.06136** 0.05492*
(0.02609) (0.02820) (0.02850) (0.02824) (0.02841)
Share of Male Owners 0.2997*** 0.2686*** 0.2325*** 0.2392*** 0.2459***
(0.04721) (0.05103) (0.05158) (0.05111) (0.05141)
Share of Male Managers 0.05952 0.09940* 0.1462*** 0.1437** 0.1474***
(0.05182) (0.05601) (0.05661) (0.05610) (0.05643)
Share of Hindu Owners 0.06151** 0.1126*** 0.1083*** 0.1081*** 0.1107***
(0.02960) (0.03200) (0.03234) (0.03205) (0.03224)
Share of firms located in Rural Sector 0.009867 0.04807** 0.06107*** 0.06779*** 0.06833***
(0.02086) (0.02255) (0.02279) (0.02258) (0.02272)
Constant 0.1963*** 0.3076*** 0.3268*** 0.3379*** 0.3461***
(0.02612) (0.02824) (0.02854) (0.02828) (0.02845)
Observations 1,641 1,641 1,641 1,641 1,641
R-squared 0.581 0.589 0.594 0.596 0.595
District FE YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE NO NO NO NO NO
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
We observe a positive relationship between court inefficiency and fractionalisa-
tion. Since, fractionalization increases when there are many small groups. We can
say that when court inefficiency is high, firms decide to alleviate any risk of breach
of contract by operating in a different industry than operating in an industry where
the firms are already existing and may have experienced breach of contract.
8 Conclusion
Enforcing contract is critical for business proliferation. However, in less developed
countries with inefficient courts, the informal networks are ubiquitous for enforcing
contracts. The prohibitively high court costs in India – mostly because of the time it
takes to settle a case in court – make moving to court for resolving disputes the last
option for an entrepreneur. But theoretically, people choose not to move to court
under two types of circumstances – when courts are very good and nobody breaches
a contract, and when the courts are so bad that going to court cannot provide a
37
remedy. Therefore, the direct effects of these two different qualities of the court
system are the same on the number of litigation (low in both cases) However, the
shadow effects of differing court quality will be different for the number of contracts.
There will be more contracts signed under a good court regime than a bad court
one. In this paper we try to estimate this shadow effect by exploiting the district
level court quality variation over time. We find that the shadow indeed works –
districts with better court efficiency have bigger firm sizes than the districts with
inefficient courts. Moreover, firm registrations are larger in districts with higher
court efficiency. More importantly, we find that socially disadvantaged groups such
as scheduled caste/tribes (SC/ST) benefit more than their general caste counterpart.
We find that SC/STs in urban areas have a higher chance to formalize their enteprise
when court quality improves. We also find as court quality deteriorates chances of
two randomly chosen firms to belong to two different industry-groups increases.
To summarize, we find significant impact of formal court system on entrepreneur-
ship. Our findings suggest that improving formal court helps entrepreneurs in general
– but the effect is stronger for socially disadvantaged groups. Also, there are higher
chances of diversification in terms of industry groups when court inefficiency is high.
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Table 23: Robustness Check:New Index
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